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FOREWORD 
With this publication the Henry Wells Lawrence Me­
m01'ial Committee sees the fulfillment of its 01'iginal hopes, 
for herein are included some of the representative writing of 
Dr. Lawrence, and the first Lawrence Memorial Lecture, 
delivered at the CoJJege, by President Charles Seymour of 
Yale .University on February 27, 1945, with the introductory
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I. WASHINGTON, CAPITALISM, AND NATIONALISM*
George Washington died in the year 1799, more than one hundred 
and thirty-two years ago. At the time ?f his dea_th his fame was alr�ady widespread and secure and the intenrunable series of laudatocy oraoons 
which he so well de�erved began at once. During the intervening 
century and more tireless orators have struggled, with increasing diffi­
culty, to pay adequate tributes of eloquenc<; to this grea� man. (?ne difficulty, which has grown with the years, 1s th�t of saying anyth�ngwhich has not already been said several hundred tunes before. Happily, 
however, so far as Washington's birthday speakers are concer�ed, patriotic American audiences desire no�ing so �uch on these �cas1�ns as the robust repetition of the resounding p�atttudes of adulaoon :,vtth which they have long been thoroughly farruliar. Indeed they are likely 
to resent as inappropriate and out of order the introduction of any other than the usual facts and points of view about our forcmosc 
national hero. 
However childish may be this taste for a reiteration of the ob­
vious, it is not peculiar to America. It is charaaeristic of most nations 
to exalt, even to deify, their most popular heroes, and to wish said 
concerning them only words of praise, fit for the commemoration of 
demigods. Such words nourish a vigorous national pride, and they 
are supposed also to fire the hearts of impressionable youth with a 
reverent determination to follow worthily in the footsteps of the great
departed. Whether it be the children of the obscure little state of 
Albania, thrilled with worshipful admiration for their warrior hero, 
Georges Scanderbeg; or the soldiers of militant Japan, pausing in 
their ruthless warfare about Shanghai to adore the spirit of an ancient 
emperor; or the patriotic citizens of the United States, mobilized for 
a bicentennial veneration of the immortal George Washington; it is 
clear enough that hero worship is common to chem all, and that this 
is a potent force in the life of every nation. That this force can be of 
incafculable worth to any people is widely recognized. That it may 
also do them incalculable harm seems to be less generally undersrood 
and to stand in need of some emphasis at this moment. 
. In our o_wn United Stat�, for instance, it may seem almosc sacri• legious _co point out that the mBuence of George Washington may beproductive of harm as well as of good. In his case, as in those of many 
o�er national heroes, it is entirely possible so to misuse his fame and 
mtsa�pl� �e lessons from his life as to produce results which he him­self, 1� livmg _ now, would be the foremost in deploring. For example, 
�ashmgton �s commonly _regarded as a steadfast supporter of polit· teal conservausm. The weight of his great name is often thrown into 
�e scales _of_ controversy against proposals for any radical modifica­tton of extStmg governmental institutions. Probably a great majority 
•This articl� was published in_ The American Scholar, Volume I, No. ;, May,
19;2, and 1s rcpnntcd here with the permission of the publisher.
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of the citizens of the United States today would deny with indignant 
amazement the assertion that the career of George Washington re­
sembles in several fundamental respects those of such modern radicals 
as the Indian Nationalist Gandhi and the Russian Bolshevik Lenin. 
Yet these three world figures have at least chis much in common: 
each of them defied the lawfully constituted authority which ruled 
his native land and, at the imminent risk of war and bloodshed, sought 
to overthrow the established political system and to replace it by one 
which most intelligent persons throughout the world condemned as, 
at best, a rash experiment, offering slight hopes of success and great 
probability of disaster. In winning independence for the new American 
republic, Washington was anything but a conservative; he was, of 
course, a revolutionary, quite as truly as Lenin and Gandhi were revo­
lutionaries. He was, however, a revolutionary of the eighteenth century, 
and therefore his ideas differ greatly from those of the revolutionaries 
of the twentieth century. It is this difference which deceives many 
into believing that he was a conservative. It is a misuse of his fame 
and a misapplication of the lesson of his life, to count him steadily 
on the conservative side of current political controversies. 
One of the easiest and most common perversions of the Washing­
ton influence is that based on bis oft-quoted advice to eighteenth cen­
tury America to steer dear of foreign entanglements and seek safety 
in a policy of diplomatic isolation. How often and how solemnly are 
his warning words quoted, and in how many different ways is the 
weight of his influence brought to bear against any steps toward in­
ternational cooperation on the pare of twentieth century United States! 
Yet Washington was giving advice concerning world conditions of the 
eighteenth century, with which he was competently familiar, and not 
concerning the unforeseeable conditions of the twentieth century. There 
is no reason to believe that he wished to fix the foreign policy of 
his country for all future time, nor that he would have given similar 
advice amid the conditions of today. Indeed, if we may imagine the 
disembodied spirit of our great first president still watchful- and solicit­
ous for the welfare of the republic he founded, it is easy to believe 
him sorrowful for the stupidity, or indignant at the insincerity, which 
prompts so many of his countrymen today co follow blindly the advice 
which was so helpful in 1797 and is so harmful in 1932. "It would 
be ironic," says a recent editorial in a powerful newspaper, "if, in 
the year in which all America is paying homage to its greatest citizen, 
the advice of Washington on the conduet of our foreign relations 
should be flouted." To which it may be fairly replied, "How in.finitely 
more ironic it would be co follow the advice which, so far as our 
present circumstances are concerned, Washington never intended to 
give." 
For, after all, Washington was not essentially an isolationist. He 
was, rather, a cooperacionist when there was opportunity for coopera­
tion on anything like a basis of equality. The historical evidence for 
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this is abundant and striking. There were plenty of isolationists in 
Washington's day, but he was not one o_f them. Oth�rs feared to encer into a league of sovereign states and nsk the curca1lmenc o�. sepa�te independence, but he actively supported such courageous cooperattoo. 
For instance, when Washington and other supf>?rters of a league wer_eproposing to bring order out_ of chaos �y adoptmg the present Co�!­
tution of the United Scates, 1c was Pamck Henry, famed and pamoac 
son of Virginia, who roared in �lis!113Y that, "This government subjeas 
everything to the Northern maiomy. :"e thus put u�bounded _powerover our property into hand� not having a common mterest with us. 
Sir, this is a picrure so homd, so wretched, so dreadful, �at I need 
no longer dwell upon it." Against thi� nightmare of Pacnck He�, 
it was Washington who directed soothmg words and calm reasonmg 
in the following persuasive letter, seeking to enlist Henry's support 
of the new League and Consritucion. 
"Your own judgment will at once discover," Washington wrote, 
"the good and the exceptionable parts of it; and your experience of 
the difficulties which have ever arisen when attempts have been made 
to reconcile such a variety of interests and local prejudices as pervade 
the several States, will render explanation unnecessary. I wish the 
Constitution which is offered, had been more perfect; but I sincerely 
believe it is the best that could be obtained at this time .... From a 
variety of concurring accounts it appears co me that the political con­
cerns of this country are in a manner suspended by a thread, and that 
the Convention has been looked up co by the refleetiog part of the 
community with a solicitude which is hardly co be conceived; and, if 
nothing bad been agreed upon by that body, anarchy would have 
ensued, the seeds being deeply sown in every soil." 
Here we see the cooperationist Washington energerically at work. 
When the time was ripe for his beloved homeland, the sovereign State 
of Virginia, to enter upon entangling alliances with the foreign states 
of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and the other ten, he boldly led her 
fo�ard out of a traditio_nal isolation and into that close cooperation 
which had become essennal to the welfare and security of all. To be 
sure Washington did, in the eighteenth century, advise that the infant 
United States of America avoid active participation in the quarrels 
of the �dult and relatively gigantic nauoos of Europe. To assume 
from this, however, that he would advise a similar isolation for the 
adult and gigantic United States of the twentieth century is co dis­
re�rd �ltoge�er the_ es�a�lished faa of his cooperative and progressiveacaon m leadmg V1rg101a to enter the League of American Nations 
under the Covenant of 1787. 
. A�other. common misuse of the influence of Washington consists
10 quoung his words when they happen to reinforce the views of the 
quoter, but denying equal publicity to those words of his which an­
cagoni�e such views. Thus, his warning against foreign entangle­
ments 1s so often quoted as co be familiar to all, but his equally vigor-
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ous aversion co the rise of political parties is much less widely known. 
Many who urge us to follow his advice on foreign policy as peren­
nially applicable and an evidence of Washington's almost superhuman 
prescience would, in all candor, be forced co admit that his warn­
ings against political parties were almost absurd. However bad these 
parties may sometimes become, the almost universal experience of 
mankind has shown that they are as indispensable to popular govern­
ment as the weather is co agriculture. Washington's failure to grasp 
this fact shows that his political intelligence had the usual human 
limitations, and that his advice on public affairs should be, like that 
of other statesmen, subjected to critical examination. 
Toward the major governmental problems of his time, neverthe­
less, Washington usually showed a competent liberalism, an attitude 
of hospitality coward changes, even fundamental ones, if they gave 
promise of general betterment. largely the economic and political 
world he lived in was patterned after the systems of an earlier period: 
systems which were on the eve of fundamental modification or re­
placement. The economic system of his age and region was localism, 
the production of com odities by household industry, for sale in a 
nearby market; yet signs were multiplying that this system was soop
to change and that commodities would more and more be produced 
by machinery and factory labor for sale in markets increasingly wide­
spread and remote. The political system of his day was imperialism, 
the ruling of colonies by a mother country for the interest and wel:. 
fare primarily of that mother country; yet many signs were evident 
which foretold a changed future in which colonies would assert their 
right and determination to be ruled primarily each for its own wel­
fare. So far from being hostile to these signs of change and readjust­
ment, Washington showed an open-minded hospitaliry toward them. 
The progress of industrial and commercial capitalism he facilitated 
by friendly tariff and financial measures. The exchange of colonial 
for national status he promoted with unflagging zeal, even at the 
price of armed violence and rebellion. His face was sceadfascly set 
toward a better economic and political future, and he dared to experi­
ment with new and uncertain systems, namely, industrial capitalism 
and republican nationalism, when the old systems seemed no longer 
adequate co meet the needs and desires of a changing world. 
It is this quality of open-minded hospitality toward economic and 
political experimentation that gives to the example of Washington 
an immediate significance in the year 1932. By this example we are 
urged, not necessarily to support the systems which he supported, but 
rather to maintain an open-minded hospitality toward experiments 
for their betterment. By way of- illustration, in the foliowing brief 
survey and criticism of the systems which dominate us today, an at­
tempt is made co view our world of the twentieth century in some­
what the same spirit as that in which Washington seems co have viewed 
his world of the eighteenth. 
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Largely the economic and political wor�d o� 1932 is patternedafter cwo great systems: capirahsm and nauonahsm. These systemshave been tested by many generation�. They proved measurably �de­quace for meeting the needs of the nineteenth century. The twenc1:thcentury, however, has subjected them co such unprecedented strainsand stresses that their continuing adequacy is gravely doubted by manythoughtful persons. Their outright destruction would imply upheavaland catastrophe; their deftation and adaptation, however, need produceno such calamitous consequences. 
The rational deflation of capitalism would leave almost unim­paired the great driving po_wer of the . urge. to acqu_isitivencss, th�u�it would transfer some of its present 10ordmate gams from the md1-vidual to the community. Capi_talism has _ lo�g. disrlayed two con­spicuous merits: a powerful sumulus co md1v1dua effort, and anenormous productivity. Alongside these, however, there have beentwo equally conspicuous faults: insecuriry, taking the form of re­oment depressions within nations, and of tariff competitions andimperialistic wars among nations; and faulry distribution, in whichselfish shrewdness rather than public service normally won dispro­portionately large rewards. The problem is, of course, to preservethese merits and to eliminate the faults; to reduce somewhat thecompetitive element and to enlarge the cooperative; to secure in theinterest of the general welfare a better coordination of effort and re­ward, a more reliable continuity of employment, using coward theseends the unavoidable minimum of collective coercion, and preserving the maximum of individual initiative consistent with social health.The technical task of making necessary readjustments is obviously so complex and wide-reaching as co challenge, perhaps co dismay, themost competent. Certainly nothing more can be attempted here than an extremely general indication of the direction in which progress in this matter may be sought. To give at least a suggestion of somethingconcrete and specific amid all this vagueness I shall hazard three bitsof advic� for the or�inary ciciz�n: fust, stop bellowing at Bolshevisman� begm to study 1t; second, mstead of merely fearing Fascism, ex­amme c�reful!y 1C:5 . adva�ta�e� and limitations; third, judge ourdemocrat1c-nauonalisuc-cap1talist1c system by its apparent adaptabilityto the needs of today and tomorrow rather than by its past achieve­ments. 
The deflation of nationalism, long overdue seems more nearly possible and more urgently necessary today than' heretofore and the tim_e is _ripe _ co urge it franklf. The large share of an ex'aggerated �anonalism 1? the present stalling of the world's economic machinery is no� so evident that the sufferers, however jingoistic they may have been 10 the past, are at last somewhat disposed to listen to faas and reason: A few tim�ly �acts on which to base a more nearly sane reasoruog about aanoaalism are the following: . 
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The rampant nationalisms of 1914 caused the World War, one of 
whose malefaccions is thac colossal derangement of trade and finance 
which so greatly helped to produce the present world depression. 
The haughty and alarmed nationalisms of the viaors in char War, 
and the resentful nationalisms of the vanquished, effeccively bar the 
establishment of any jusc and orderly security on which to rebuild 
the welfare of humanity. 
National greed for exclusive economic advantage bas cluttered up 
the world with tariff walls, thus denying major commercial benefits 
to all in order to secure minor gains for a few. 
The dogma, so widely and devoutly believed in today, that no 
nation can honorably tolerate limitations on its sovereignty, is a pe­
culiarly malignant and provocative survival of ancient tribalism, offer­
ing only disaster co the closely knit civilization of our times. 
The boasdul assumption of unique excellence and unquestionable 
righteousness for one's own nation, as commonly fostered by the 
schools, the press, and the politicians of nearly all countries, makes 
peace precarious and war perennially imminent. 
Ac critical moments the wisdom of international statesmanship is 
futile and powerless in face of the fervor and the fury of narrowly 
nationalistic patriotisms. According to the current phrase, "no gov­
ernment could survive" in Poland or Germany, for instance, which 
took a rational position toward the problem of the Polish Corridor 
and Danzig, or in Japan and China which viewed the vexatious 
Manchurian and Shanghai tangles in a judicial rather than a jingoistic 
manner. With a perfervid nationalism thus passing beyond rational 
guidance in any grave international emergency almost anywhere in 
the world, the safety, or even the survival, of our civilization is 
doubtful. 
In the presence of these facts, thoughtful and courageous persons 
in every nation should lead a direct attack on that inflated nationalism 
which the twentieth century bas inherited and cherished as one of 
its most precious prejudices. A deflated nationalism would not, of 
course, solve all our international problems immediately, but it seems 
to be an indispensable preliminary to their solution. 
It is, I believe, no fantastic presumption to claim that the influence 
of Washington's example is in accord with criticisms and proposals 
such as those just given. His support of indusuial capitalism and 
republican nationalism in the eighteenth century carries no assurance 
that he would approve the continuance of these systems unchanged, 
if they seemed no longer adequate amid twentieth century conditions. 
What his example teaches is rather that a wise conservatism includes 
a watchful readiness to modify, or even to replace, outmoded insti­
tutions. It is highly desirable, moreover, that the mighty influence of 
Washington be rescued from those who are crying to exploit it wholly 
in the interest of reaction and a return co eighteenth century "nor­
malcy." Patriotic celebrations in honor of national heroes, American 
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and other too often take on the charaaer of exhortations either to 
stand pat' where we now are, or else to go back to "the good old 
days," even though these very heroes we �e lauding were aaive chiefly 
in leading on to better days ahead. It is a perverse and dangerous 
misuse of the memory of our pioneer statesmen to count chem as 
upholders of the status quo .. Geor�e \Vashington led armed revolt against the status quo, and hts leadmg was forward coward the new, 
not backward toward the old. Now is the critical moment for em­
phasizing this fact. While all America is celebr�ting c�e bicentennial 
of his birth let us send the challenge far and wide agarnst those who 
misuse his name and fame as a shelter for outworn institutions and 
ideas. Surely Washington was of that number who courageously 
turned their backs upon the false securities of the past and ventured 
hopefully forth into the creative uncertainties of the future. The 
forward-looking Americans of today have an indefeasible right to 
claim him as their spiritual ancestor and co invoke his blessing on 
their constructive efforts to rescue our common country and our com­
mon world by moving courageously forward. 
II. OUR NEXT PRESIDENT'S JOB IS LIKE LINCOLN'S*
Eighty years ago, in 1860, a presidential campaign was being
fought for the saving of democracy and the United Scates of .America. 
It elected Abraham Lincoln. The story of how he then proceeded to 
save his country and democracy, may throw a little light on the terrific 
task ahead of Franklin Roosevelt or Wendell Willkie, in steering our 
ship of state through the desperate storms of the war which burst 
upon the world just a year ago. 
In Lincoln's day the United States of America was the only large­
scale experiment in government by the people under republican forms 
anywhere in the world; a sort of oasis of democracy in a vast desert 
of monarchies. Its downfall had long been predicted, and at length 
seemed about to happen, over slavery and secession. If it accually did 
happen, the cause of political democracy in the modern world was 
probably lost, at lease for several generations. 
In mt,ering this crisis, Lincoln not only resorted co war. He, 
further, began the outright abolishment of an economic system that 
might fairly � called 100 per cent American; a system chat had ante­
dated . the nat:10� and �own up with it, contributing largely to itsmatenal prosperity. This system was the well-established practice of 
human slavery. Thu_s in the 1860's democracy was preserved, thoughan outworn econoIDJc 5rstem - that of plantation slave labor - was
overthrown and great v1?le'?-ce done co numerous property righcs long 
guaranteed by the Consuruuon. 
•This article is dated September, 194-0, and was sold to Every W ult Mag,ai,r, 
Permission for reprinting has been given by NEA Service, Inc., Qeveland. 
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Will Roosevelt, or the man elected to succeed him, find it neces­
sary to resort to equally desperate expedients in rescuing American 
democracy from its ferociously aggressive totalitarian foes and rivals? 
Toward answering this urgent question, it may be helpful to jot 
down a few points of comparison between democracy's predicament 
in 1860 and in 1940. 
In 1860 American democracy was still relatively youthful, experi­
mental, and untested, eyed with distrust and dislike by the European 
neighbors, who had long supported monarchy. Today it is our democ­
racy which is mature - its enemies say decrepit - daring from before 
1789, and its rivals which are youthful and full of pep and swagger, 
fascist Italy dating back only to 1922, Nazi Germany to 1933, and 
Bolshevik Russia to 1917; all more or less united by a common hatred 
of democracy, and all on the prowl against their neighbors. The chief 
prowler in Lincoln's time was France, under Emperor Napoleon III, 
who was as eager to annex Latin America as Hider is now supposed 
to be; both of them putting new life into our Monroe Doctrine. 
Russia. was then friendly to the Union, that is the North, and to the 
capitalist system, but not to democracy. Great Britain, more powerful 
in the world then than she is at this moment, was favoring Southern 
aristocracy rather than Northern democracy. 
In general, however, political and economic thinking seemed 
steadier in Lincoln's world than in ours. The great explosion of 1789, 
the French Revolution, was seventy years in the past, and the great 
war against Napoleon I had �en pretty well liquidated since 1815. 
Imperialism seemed secure; nationalism was rapidly winning its way; 
and capitalism was hardly challenged. In contrast, our present ideology 
is feverishly unsettled. The great war of 1914-1918, instead of being 
liquidated, seems co have been only adjourned; and the great Russian 
explosion of 1917 had not yet ceased to echo when we were startled 
again by similar upheavals touched off by Mussolini and Hider. Im­
perialism seems to be changing masters; nationalism is deforming itself 
into a paganized and war-provoking religion; and capitalism begins to 
look like a fat lamb among hungry wolves of totalitarianism. 
Nevertheless, Lincoln's problem was in some respects tougher 
than today's. It was closer at band; inside the country, instead of 
across a couple of oceans. It was less postponable; before Lincoln 
actually reached the White House, South Carolina and other states had 
begun to break up the Union, and down in Alabama the sentiment 
was emblazoned on a banner, "Resistance to Lincoln is Obedience to 
God." The phrase "If Lincoln is elected" had long been used some­
what as we say "If Hitler invades the Western Hemisphere." 
Lincoln had plenty of advice as to what he should do to solve 
this terrifying problem. The New York Herald, "the most powerful 
organ in the country for the formation of public opinion," told him 
Hady co turn the presidency over to somebody else. "A grand oppor­
tunity now exists," said its editorial, "for Lincoln co avert impending 
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ruin and invest his name with an immortality far more enduring than 
wouid attach to it by his elevation to the Presidency. His wi�dra�al ac chis time from the scene of confticc, and the surcender of his claims 
to some national man who would be acceptable to both sections, would 
render him the peer of Washington in patriotism .. If he persists in hispresent position, in the teeth of such results as �•s elecuon must pro­
duce, he will cotter into a dishonored grave, driven there perhaps by 
the hand of an assassin, leaving behind him a memory more execrable 
than that of Arnold -more despised than that of the traitor Catiline." 
Similar advice from southern newspapers was less politely phrased. 
The Richmond Examiner, for instance, resented Virginia's necessity "to 
bend her haughty neck beneath the paw of the Abolition orangoucang 
that skulked co Washington the other day from the wilds of Illinois." 
These gentle admonitions may remind some today of occasional remarks 
about "chat man in the White House" and bis possible third term. 
Then as now several ways of meeting the appalling problem were 
open co the President. He might submit co aggression; but Lincoln 
could hardly do that after condemning Buchanan's rumored surrender 
of Fort Sumter with the angry outburst, "If that is true they ought co 
hang him!" Nor does such submission fit very well with Roosevelt's 
remarks about quarantining aggressors and stabbings in the back. 
Indeed, his attitude seems co be more like chat of the fiery abolitionist 
agitator, William Lloyd Garrison, who when rebuked with, "Mr. 
Garrison, you are coo excited -you are on fire!" replied, "I have 
need to be on lire, for I have icebergs around me to melt!" The "ice­
bergs" today might be the so-called "isolacioniscs," who, right or wrong, 
keep a good deal cooler amid all the fire and fury than the President 
thinks they should be. 
Debate still goes on about the wisdom of Lincoln in refusing the 
middle way of meeting his problem, namely, compromise, instead of 
war; and many are inclined to prefer Roosevelt's policy, up to dace, 
of avoiding, or at least postponing, war while accively aiding what 
seems co most of us the right side by technically neutral means. Such 
would probably urge that Lincoln saved democracy the hard way, 
just as the lives of many wounded Civil War soldiers were saved the hard 
way, that is by amputation of their limbs, whereas today democracy may 
�rhaps be saved more _skillfully, �ithout c�e costly amputations of life, liberty, and the purswt of happmess which war necessarily involves. 
�e�s woul? point _out, however, the grave risks run by the war­avo1dmg policy, lest 1t enable the wrong side co triumph. 
The question we started with still remains unanswered. If war 
com�, or ev�n if it does not, will the President today find it necessary, 
as Lincoln did, to lop off some outworn economic institution in order 
�o save democracy? . As we l?Ok back upon plantation slavery now, it1s not hard co realize �at 1t needed to be lopped off. But it was 
pr<?6ably as hard _co realize _that need, and possibility, in 1860, as it 1s 10 1940 to see JUSt what 1s wrong, and curable, in our present cco-
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nomic system. Is there, perhaps, some truth in the ceaseless jibing at 
us by our totalitarian rivals that our so-called democracy is really a 
plutocracy? That it is best suited to the exploitation of the stupid 
many by the smart few? That we are actually ruled by a little group 
of multi-millionaires, through their control of press, radio, public opin­
ion, jobs, the courts, and the police? That the blessings of democracy 
come chiefly co a tiny fraction of the population, who allow co the 
exploited masses only the crumbs of prosperity, and who have now 
stalled their own economic machine by depriving these masses of ade­
quate purchasing power ? 
Whoever will save democracy today muse do something about 
questions like these, in addition to checking the depredations of such 
obstreperous fellows as Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. Whoever can 
solve all these tremendous problems, or even put them on the way 
coward a rational solution, will deserve a place beside Lincoln in the 
esteem of his fellow citizens, and share with him the splendid tide 
of "savior of democracy." 
III. DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE*
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for 
the peoples to dissolve the political bounds which have separated them 
from one another, and co unite the Powers of the earth in the coopera­
tive and controlling organization to whose benefits the Laws of Nature 
and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the intelligence 
of mankind requires that they declare the causes which impel them 
co this cooperation. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created 
equal ; that they are endowed by their Cre;ltOr with certain unalienable 
Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi• 
ness. That co secure these rights, Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; 
that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to 
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles 
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safery and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will 
dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for 
light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, 
that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, 
than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are 
accustomed. But when a long train of injustices and calamities, show­
ing invariably the Government's inadequacy, evinces its helplessness 
co save them from absolute Ruin, it is their right, it is their dury, to 
•This article is undated. There is no evidence that it was published.
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throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future 
security. 
Such bas been the patient sufferance of the Nations of the world 
today; and such is now the necessity whi:11 constrains them to alter their 
former Systems of Government. The history of the �resent system �f 
international relations is a history of repeated aggressions and calaau­
ties, all having in natural sequence the establishment of a d
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astating 
chaos among the nations. To prove this, lee Faces be submmed co a 
candid world. 
Toe present system of international relations has now arrived at 
the following situation: 
In Europe, war seems so close at hand that almost frantic efforts 
are being made merely co postpone it. 
In the Far East, Japan is relying on the imminence of a European 
war as a safeguard against interference in her ruthless empire building. 
All signs point to the early outbreak of a vast international 
struggle, which few desire but nobody knows how to avert. 
The collapse of several illusory supports of international peace, 
such as the Versailles Treaty, has greatly alarmed the peoples of the 
world. A terror of uncertainty envelops them like a noxious fog, 
and they are ready to be led into desperate undertakings, seeking 
escape from their hideous insecurity and suffering. 
Half the world is bent on seizing the possessions of the ocher 
half. Italy, Germany, and Japan are educating their youth into mad 
dogs of patriotism. Grear Britain, France, and the United States are 
preparing to defend, but never co share, their more or less ill-gotten 
territories and advantages. 
Millions in many countries are so near the starvation line, and 
so far below the comfort line, chat che immediate prospect of jobs and 
good wages, aeared even by war, entices them like a mirage in a 
thirsty desert. 
War, as the ultimate means for deciding the questions we really 
care about, has never been honestly abandoned or adequately replaced. 
le is the logical climax of chat ruthless and competitive smartness which 
nations commonly practice toward each other in lieu of generosity or 
even of fair dealing . 
. In earlier stages of this calamitous situation, We, the peace­lovmg common people of the world, have Petitioned for Redress in 
the most humble terms. Our repeated Petitions have been answered 
only by repeate� evasions, postponements, and futilities. A system 
whose character 1s thus marked by every aa which may reveal inade­
quacy, is evidently unfit to guide the destiny of enlightened peoples. 
Nor have we, in each nation, been wanting in our attentions to 
our foreign brethren. We have joined them, from time to rime, in 
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attempting legislation to promote a common jurisdiction over us all. 
We have reminded each other of the circumstances of our common 
humanity and interests. We have appealed to each other's native jus­
tice and magnanimity, and we have conjured each other by the ties 
of our common kindred, to disavow these narrow nationalisms, which 
would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. Yet 
our traditions and our rulers have been deaf to the voice of justice 
and of consanguinity. We must therefore acquiesce in the necessity 
to denounce these traditions and these rulers, and hold them as the 
enemies of Mankind and of Peace. 
We, therefore, the peace-loving com on people of the world, 
uniting in earnest consideration of our present emergencies, appealing 
to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, 
in the Name and by the Authority of all free people everywhere, 
solemnly publish and declare that these widely scattered peoples are, 
and of right ought to be, closely united in cooperative and interde­
pendent states; that they are absolved from all exclusive and unlimited 
al egiance to the states of their present citizenship, and that all such 
political connection between them and their several states is, and ought 
to be, rotally dissolved, and that, as a dose union of cooperative and 
interdependent states, they have full Power to outlaw War, guarantee 
Peace, regulate Alliances, unfetter Commerce, and do all other necessary 
Acts and Things which the several independent and competitive states 
have shown themselves unable to do for the essential welfare of mankind. 
And for the support of this Declaration, with a furn reliance on 
the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other 
our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor. 
IV. EXCERPTS FROM AN UNFINISHED PAPER FOR
MEMORIAL DAY, 1941* 
Today the leading nations of the world are busy again, 
preparing for the long continuance of Memorial Days ; and a vast 
number of citizens of the United States are in a state of alarm and honest 
bewilderment as to whether we too should now plunge into the slaugh­
ter. Most of us may agree that the whole thing is a tragic and stupid 
mess ..... 
We are all buried under an avalanche of urgent questions that 
nobody can answer competently. Should we be isolationists? Should 
we be interventionists? Or is there some, better, middle ground? Is 
Hider, at the moment, invincible? Must he, nevertheless, be crushed? 
*This paper contains parts of several speeches, letters to Editors, and other 
prepared articles. It seems to be a summary of bis views prepared by Dr.
Lawrence in the spring of 1941, and is, therefore, of particular interest. 
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Or is there some other way toward making the war less ruinous to us 
and our hopes? .... If our earlier views about avoiding all war n�w 
seem to us unrealistic and futile, does this show that we are berng 
corrupted by propaganda, or rather that we are being enlightened by 
events? 
Neatly formulated answers to such questions do not en�. ourpainful doubtings. On the contrary, they often arouse our susp1aons. 
Who are the people who advise us to be isolationists?. lovers ofAmerica, no doubt, and haters of war; but the same advice comes to 
us from the lovers of Hider and from those who wish co keep America 
defenseless. Who tell us to be interventionists? Those who seek to 
end the existing international anarchy, and those who doubt that we 
can long escape the anti-democratic domination of a victorious Hitler; 
but we get very similar advice from our own munitioneers and our new 
imperialists, charmed by the vision of an American super-empire dom­
inant over all other empires. . . . . 
More than we realize too, our thinking today is filled with fury 
and shon-sightedness. This is panly because war is necessarily furious; 
partly also because nobody possesses adequate fore-sightedness. Our 
best hope, it seems co me lies in trying to be as reasonable and as 
realistic as we can, and in trying to look ahead, beyond the ending 
of the war. In doing this, no doubt we shall often be misunderstood 
.... but this should neither surprise nor dismay us. We shall merely 
be doing our bit, or at least trying to, toward rescuing the war from 
complete futility . .... 
I find that my own views have changed during the past year 
about the pan that the United Scates should play in the present war. 
It jolted me a little to read the other day the following paragraphs 
which I had written and published in April of 1940: I quote: 
"Two rational but sharply conflicting views as to what the 
United States should do toward ending the present war, seem 
to be gaining wide suppcn. Stating them here might help to 
clarify somebody's thinking. One view may be stated somewhat 
as follows: 'Narrowly considered, our interests are with the 
Allies, in that both they and we are the privileged possessors of 
the best parts of the earth; we enjoy a common rulership by the 
benevolent bourgeoisie; and we are comparatively loyal to the 
stat11.r q110 in ec�nomi�, politics, _morality and religion. Therefore,we should hearnly praise the Allies and as heanily damn Germany 
till the necessity for defeating Dictatorship and Naziism shall seem 
to most of us a sufficient reason for our entrance into the military 
struggle.' The other view runs thus. 'More broadly considered, 
the welfare of all peoples, including ourselves and the present 
belligerents on both sides, would probably be best served by a 




Therefore, we in the United States would better resist the rising 
tide of propaganda for scapegoatism, and hold out for funda­
mental reconcilements, economic, political, moral and religious. 
Certainly not before such reconciiements are dearly attainable, 
should we consider any military participation in the war.'" 
It was the last sentence especially in this year-old opinion that jolted 
me most: "no military participation in the war" by us till fundamental 
reconcilements are "clearly attainable." I have come to doubt gravely the 
possibility of "fundamental reconcilements" with a victorious Hitler, 
and also to doubt the substantial checking of these victories until the 
full strength of the United States is thrown into the war. If that full 
strength can be acrually mobilized only by our declaring, and whole­
heartedly entering, war, then, I think, we should no longer stop short 
of war; and I mean "shooting war," and the sooner the better. 
To such a stand as this, the isolationists and many of the unde­
cided will immediately object that we would thus be sticking out our 
neck in a matter that was fundamentally none of our business . . . 
The Western Hemisphere is inevitably part of Hitler's business. Unless 
he rules it, his basic principle of Nazi domination breaks down. The 
Germans cannot really be supermen if half the world escapes them and 
continues to defy them. Hitler's way of life contradicts ours so funda­
mentally that reconcilement seems impossible ..... 
At about this point we would do well, I think, to consider a 
myth that is gaining wide credence nowadays, a defeatist myth, care­
fully nourished by the Nazis; the myth of Hitler's invincibility. Is 
Hitler really invincible? The Nazi propagandists would like to have 
us think so. He certainly did get the jump on his antagonists, and 
he is still going strong. But history is crowded with conquerors that 
were considered invincible for a long time. By superiority of one sort 
or another they won brilliant victories, and, lo! they were labelled 
"invincible." Gusty popular alarm created a myth about them, a de­
featist myth, that resistance against them was futile . . . . History 
strongly suggests that, soon or late, the myth of invincibility explodes 
in the face of its promoters. 
There is another myth that still awaits exploding; the myth that 
international, military war is permanently inevitable; as permanently 
inevitable as a lot of other pests of mankind were long supposed to 
be, such as witchcraft, human slavery, and a long list of now curable 
diseases and preventable plagues. Though the explosion of this war 
myth is by no means "just around the corner," the present moment 
seems to me very opportune for setting a bomb under it. The meta­
phorical bomb that I have in mind for this useful task of destroying, 
or at least damaging, the war myth, is the mobilizacio� and purposeful 
direction of hate - H A. T E ! Hate directed, not agamst the boys on 
the other side of No Man's Land, whom our boys are required to 
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shoot; but against the real enemy, the '?':uses of war: poli_ti?1l causes,economic causes, emotional causes, tradmonal causes, stupidity causes. 
1f there is some truth in the view thac mankind is on the long way 
up from ferocity to fraternity, we should noc fail co ucili_ze his presentoucburstS of ferocity in a tremendous effort co destroy its causes, the 
basic causes of war. 
In this present war we should make our bate more intelligent! 
Wars cannot go on without hace. The trouble with most wars has been 
that the bare was misdirected - was aimed at the wrong things . 
Needed today is a hatred against the people and the things chat made 
today's war inevitable. Till Hider and his supporters are stopped, 
doubtless our fury must be directed chiefly at the Germans; but Jong 
before they are crushed into helplessness, it will be time to channel our 
hare against those causes of war also that happen co come from our 
side. . . . . The permanent enemy of us all is not frenzied Germany 
so much as it is the greedy or careless willingness of many of us every­
where to make gain out of exploitation, cruelty, and injustice practiced 
against human beings who happen to be outside our national, racial, 
or religious group, or our economic class. Now, when we are so deeply 
stirred by war, right now, is the moment to direct our war hatreds 
against war itself, and against the narrow nationalisms, the covetous 
imperialisms, the bigoted racialisms, and the ruthless business compe­
titions, which inevitably invite war all the time. In our present angry 
mood, we are ripe for demanding of all governments, including our 
own, any necessary changes and sacrifices coward ending anarchy among 
nations and poverty within them. This is not a demand for any sudden 
change in human nature. It is a demand, rather, for certain organiza­
tions and restraints which human nature so obviously needs, and which 
angcy common sense among the democracies may now at last insist 
on applying. S111pid hatred may ruin us all, buc intelligent hatred, 
against the real causes of war, instead of against scapegoats, may save 
us all from the cursed continuance of the war tradition. . . . 
In considering this proposal, or any other, looking coward the 
gradual or speedy elimination of international, military warfare, we 
should never forget chat Hitler and his followers have no desire to 
eliminate such warfare. They consider ic morally healthful; a bracing 
conic; an essential part of their so-called "new order;" the crest of 
their "wave of the future." Hence to find ourselves fighting a second 
"war co end war," is by no means absurd. le is a clumsy way; a stupid 
way; a way cbac could have been avoided, if the victors of 1918 had 
been less shore-sighted and less greedy; hue right now ic is the only 
way left co us. Unless Hider is stopped and a totalitarian triumph 
prevented, interoacion�, military war will be given a new lease on 
�fe; a new rcspeaab1lity; and the prospect of a more peaceful and 
nght�us world order must be postponed for generations, perhaps for
centuries. Democracy bas bungled badly enough the cask of establish· 
18 
ing a regime of peace and justice, but it has at least tried. Totalitarian­
ism has no intention of trying. 
. . . . . The liberty which we will fight to save from the tyranny 
of totalitarianism is not the liberty of every citizen to hunt in vain 
for a job, nor to be undeservedly penniless in his old age. Nor are 
we all anxious to preserve the liberty of the most aggressive and 
most ruthless few to gain the exclusive ownership of vast wealth. The 
liberty we will fight to preserve, or perhaps to attain, includes a real 
and stabilized opportunity for almost everybody to live productively 
and with a decent minimum of coercive restraint on each individual's 
desire to pursue truth and happiness according to his own best judg­
ment. 
In viewing the monstrous confusions in the world today, it is 
hard to know whether to fear the impending darkness or to welcome 
the approaching dawn. Too little have we considered the unmeasured 
possioilicies for human betterment that lie just below the surface of our 
present hideous war. If the promise of democracy had not been so 
outrageously disappointed by its unworthy supporters, the world need 
not have been menaced by totalitarianism. Probably it is not yet coo 
lace for the promise of democracy to be fulfilled, if we are at lase 
awake co the opportunity that comes only in a desperate emergency. 
Human institutions, like molten steel, can be poured into new molds 
only at terrific temperatures. Today these temperatures throughout the 
world are melting down our institutions in the blast furnace of total 
war. Whether we like it or not, these old institutions muse quickly 
be poured into new molds - worse molds, perhaps; better molds, 
possibly. The totalitarians have a brand new set of molds, designed 
co hold humanity in a rigid framework of servile submission, sterile 
regimentation, and ruthless intolerance. Contradicting all these horrors, 
the democratic opportunity is co provide different molds, suited to 
produce institutions for guiding human beings coward citizen liberty, 
creative individualism, and tolerant cooperativeness. . . . 
But how does all this affect you and me, and how may we, each 
of us, play a worthy part in the new scenes? Does the war affect 
you as a kind of "black-out" of hope, and .a paralysis of purposeful 
effort? In this scene your part is not co drift along with others coward 
despair or frantic fury. It is, rather, co react vigorously against both 
these, for your own sake and for the common good. If you have any 
reserve power - any religious faith, any philosophic calm, any stub­
born courage - use it now. Civilization is not collapsing. It is being 
poured into new molds, at terrific temperatures. Democracy is not 
finished. le has grown fat, and a bit soft; probably it needed the 
sharp challenge of its fanatical rivals; but its services to civilization 
are still indispensable. 
. . . . . I urge you not to cake a defeatist or fatalistic attitude 
toward your present prospects. Such an attitude would not only lessen 
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your chance to set the times right; it would also destroy your oppor­
tuniry to achieve a nobiliry of spirit, without which life itself is of 
very doubtful value. Nor do you need to believe that the present 
evil times cannot be set right. The accumulated forces of today are 
supremely potent, for good no less than for evil. In a broad sense, 
mankind has triumphed over Nature, and may now utilize, as never 
before, her vast resources for the betterment of human life. There 
remains only the difficult, but not impossible, task of preventing a 
fatally destructive misuse of these powers - by war, by greed, by Stu· 
pidity. The successful performance of that task is not known to be 
beyond the reach of your generation - to make a beginning at least. 
I exhort you, therefore, to give yourselves the benefit of a very reason­
able doubt, and to attempt that task hopefully. 
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THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS 
By CHARLES SEYMOUR, Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D. 
President of Yale University 
With Introduction by FRANKE. MORRIS, Ph.D. 
Professor of Philosophy, Connecticut College 
DR. MORRIS: 
Once in awhile a man or a woman comes into a community and 
makes a mark there that is indelible. Such an individual is not neces­
sarily a great thinker or a brilliant mind. Creative thought, brilliance 
of mind,-these may be present to a greater or lesser degree; but by 
themselves they are not the reason for the deep and lasting impression 
made on friends and associates. The real reason seems to be a quality 
or group of qualities characterizing a person rather than a mind. There 
is a certain quiet sincerity, indicating growth beyond the level of self­
seeking and competitive ambition; a genuineness that comes from 
years of loyalty to higher than personal aims; a generosity of interest 
in ideas and in other people. 
These qualities - sincerity, genuineness, generosity of interest -
were, for chose of us fortunate enough to know him, outstanding traits 
in Dr. Henry Wells Lawrence, Professor of History and Government at 
Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. And they are the reasons 
why his personal memory will live as long as we live. 
Dr. Lawrence was a lovable person, but he was also the embodi­
ment of an ideal, the ideal of the liberal free mind, the mind inde­
pendent and courageous enough to acknowledge no master save truth. 
It is chis ideal which we wish to honor in the Henry Wells Lawrence 
Memorial Lectureship, having its auspicious beginning this evening. 
It is the liberal ideal as we who knew him know was represented in 
high degree by Henry Lawrence. Time will inexorably bring it about 
that Dr. Lawrence, the person and friend, will be forgotten ; but that 
which he stood for, that which he served, will not be forgotten. And 
I believe that his highest wish would be that we should do just what 
we are doing: establishing a lectureship with the long-time purpose 
of holding high the ideal he himself folfowed,-the ideal of liberalism. 
It is particularly gratifying that our first lecturer in the series 
should be on every count precisely suitable to this occasion. Dr. 
Seymour, President of Yale University, was a friend of Dr. Lawrence 
and a fellow-student. He is himself an eminent exponent of the liberal 
ideal. He is a distinguished scholar in the field of history. He was 
a member of the peace conference at Paris after the first world war. 
He is at present a member of the Connecticut post-war planning com­
mission. Among some of his more important books bearing on the 
topic, of tonight's lecture are: "The Diplomatic Background of the 
War," "Woodrow Wilson and the World War," "The Intimate Papers 
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of Colonel House," and "American Diplomacy During the World 
War." 
The topic of the lecrure this evening is "The Problem of Inter­
national Security: Historical Backgrounds." le is an honor and a 
pleasure to present co you our first Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial 
lecturer, Dr. Charles Seymour. 
PRESIDENT SEYMOUR: 
It is with a deep sense of privilege th�c chi_s opporrunicy comes 
to me of delivering the first of the lectures m mbute co the memory 
of Henry Lawrence. I could only wish that it might serve ad�quac71y
co express the gratitude which those of us feel who worked wtth him 
and also played a little in student d�ys in Paris �d New H�ven 
thirty-five years ago. Lawrence was slightly my sc�or and co him I 
am deeply indebted, not merely for the personal kindness chat means 
so much in the first discouraging stage of graduate study but for the 
inspiration of his own devotion co serious scholarship and the example 
he sec of the sacrifices necessary to achieve it. I am equally mindful 
of the rare geniality that informed his scholarship. His dissertation 
was concerned with institutional history but he never forgot that insci­
rutions are merely an expression of human relationships. The interest 
he cook in the past was concerned with actual human beings worthy of per• 
sonal understanding and not with the dead puppets which some historians 
cause to dance suspended from arid strings. le was inevitable that, as 
he wrote history in his later years, his interpretation should have been 
increasingly in terms of men and women. 
It was equally inevitable that he should have intensified his 
earlier conviction that the past is important co us because of its rele­
vance co the present, and chat he became constantly more interested 
in the application of the lessons of history to concemporary policies,
whether in the local, the national, or the international field. The more 
history he learned the more clearly he understood and brought before 
his listeners the necessity of international cooperation. We used co 
talk of the _relationship of the historian to contemporary events, and the underlymg th_ou_ght of what I have co say tonight springs from 
th� commo_n co_nv1cnon we _held that public opinion must be provided with an h1stoncal foundaoon so solid that its conclusions will resc 
not_ upon emotion but upon knowledge. Indeed my chief interest is 
to illustrate,. by examples from our recent history, what Lawrence once called the high cost of popular ignorance. 
I am assuming, as he used to assume, that the nation muse evolve 
a cl�r policy based pr_imarily ll:pon purely American interests but 
evolvmg plans for Amencan security through incemacional cooperation. 
My person�l exp�rience twenty-five years ago, as well as more recent 
contacts with various boards and committees has left me without il­
lusion as _ �o the pitfalls of post-war planning. There is not merelymuch fuultcy but even more of danger in the drafting of political blue 
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prints which sec forth a system that is perfect in every respect, save 
that it demands too much of human nature. Bue there is equal peril, 
or greater, in refusing the prerogative given co man, as well as co 
squirrels - that of looking ahead and preparing for what we may 
reasonably assume lies before us. If a man cannot live wisely without 
a basic philosophy, a nation cannot live safely without a studied policy. 
That policy must be formulated in clear terms and its implications must 
be analyzed. Above all it muse be founded upon fact and not upon 
theory. 
The interest of America, as a nation, in foreign affairs is very 
recent; inevitably our undersranding of the factors that determine world 
relationships has been superficial. For generations we could afford the 
luxury of temperamental isolation from events that went on overseas. 
During the nineteenth century we were freed from all serious preoccu­
pation with foreign affairs, largely by reason of the dominance of the 
British Fleet in the Atlantic and by a continued and reasonably stable 
balance of power on the continent of Europe. Even so late as 1914 
we watched the tragedy of Sarajevo and the disastrous bankruptcy of 
�e European system much as we would regard scenes in a moving­
picture snow. 
We did not clearly understand that our vital interests were closely 
menaced by the danger of German control of Europe. Our intervention 
in the first world war, as we were careful to state, was not based upon 
our interest; we entered the war rather upon the theory of an idealistic 
crusade for the rights of free people everywhere, or as a defense 
against the attack upon our doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Mo­
mentarily the nation was persuaded by Wilsonian idealism. Bue there 
was little appreciation of the fact that conditions of national securiry 
as well as of industrial welfare imposed upon us the necessity of 
participating actively in world politics and therefore of knowing some­
thing about world affairs. 
When Wilsonian theories evaporated in the early twenties, and 
the process was rapid, there developed inevitably a sense of self­
congratulation that we were spared die perils and the intrigues char­
acteristic of European diplomacy, not untinged by a consciousness of 
self-righteousness that we were not as those others are; it was accom­
panied by a determination that having been once bitten in the World War 
we would henceforth be doubly shy. We could not even recognize thar 
there was such an international organization as the League of Nations. 
We were able eagerly to embrace the Kellogg Pact because it was 
purely negative and because it embodied what was becoming a popular 
principle of inaction: peace without responsibility. We really believed 
when we passed the Neutrality Act of 1935 that by emulating the 
turtle we could keel? safe and pure. If war came we would have no�­
ing to do with the dirty business. Our sins were only those of orrus­
sion it is true; but we forgot that in the general confession sins of 
omission are rated as more important than sins of commission. "We 
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have left undone those things whkh we ought co have done," comes 
fusr. 
Our policy during these years was determined. by _e�oti�n r�er cbao by cbe interest of the nation. We crusted co mrumon, m which 
some western senators are strong, and we called it wisd�m. Th�re were a few instructed and intelligent men, some of chem mfluenong 
our foreign relations. Bue as a whole the nae.ion was_ ignorant and ournational policy was inevitably naive. There 1s a saying chat what you 
don't know won't hurt you. Lase spring in a brilliant article Professor 
Carl Becker pointed out chat in cbose years between wars, "what we 
didn't know burr us a lot." 
le is a pleasant American custom to contrast favorably our own 
innocence of international affairs with the experience of the Europeans 
and co insist upon ic as a virrue. Indeed histories have been written 
of the last Peace Conference around the issue of our simple honesty 
contending against the wily intrigues of our European associates in the 
war. We forget that our Lord, while he urges us co be harmless as 
doves, also adjures us to be wise as serpents. Naivete can frequencly 
do a lot of harm. And it is a fact that our ignorance of the realities 
of international relations and our innocent expectations of char Peace 
Conference gave rise co false hopes the crushing of which brought on 
a reaction of disillusionment. We committed an initial mistake, which 
should never be repeated, of underrating the difficulties of peace­
making. 
Peace does not come with an armistice or even with the signing 
of a document called a peace treaty. Peace implies a reconciliation of 
enemies. Bue in a gathering held on the morrow of a biccer four years 
struggle like cbe lase war, there was little of the spirit of conciliation, 
and an assembly of archangels and martyrs would have been impotent 
to create it. It was hopeless co expect cbac from chat atmosphere of 
belligerency could/roceed decisions chat did not cake accouoc of the bitter suffering an losses of the victors who were able co impose the 
terms �d would certainly make the defeated pay. In every peace treaty he �e germs o� the next war which can only be eliminated by 
�e followmg gener�uon. S�;er <JUOtes the German diplomatist who mverced the old Lann motto In tune of Peace prepare for War" inco 
"Si 11i1 bell11m para pacem," - if you want a war call a peace con­
ference . 
. . _The difficulties of the peace�ers were intensified by the respon­s1b1licy thrown upon them of bnngmg some sore of immediate order 
out of world chaos. They were expected to produce a plan of perma­
nent _peace satisfactory to 30 odd alli�d states, five enemy states, to say noth1�g ?f the n�utrals, ac the same ume chat they aaed as an executive comrmss1on settling the turbulent current affairs of the entire world. 
At the moment the great war ended a dozen minor wars broke out -
Poles and Czechs, Roumaniaos and Serbs Austrians and Slovenes 
Hungarians and Slovaks. All these wars had to be liquidated. Coai 
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mines and factories and railroads had to be reestablished. Food and 
fuel distributed. The war was over but no peace was yet at hand. The 
same men sat in the morning as the Supreme War Council and in the 
afternoon as the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. 
In our simplicity we supposed that these men who were to de­
termine the fate of th� w?rld were all-powerful, and as we hoped,
for good. -And the 1llus1on was fostered as you watched them in 
council, those men who had led their peoples to triumph. Clemenceau, 
the apostle of victory in the darkest days of 1917, presiding in his 
squat black cut-away and square boots and eternally grey-gloved 
hands-dry and cruel in his rapier-like wit - it took the recipient 
seconds to realize he was wounded, so sharp was the blade. Wilson, 
poised and reassured by the eager devotion of the smaller nationalities 
seeking awards, with the proper air of a popular professor. Lloyd 
George and Balfour - at opposite poles of manner - the first on the 
edge of his chair, enthusiastic and mercurial - incredibly ignorant of 
continental history and geography but intuitively wise in his judgment 
of political issues, whether domestic or international; Balfour, with 
his head on the back of the chair and several yards of leg stretched 
out in front, apparently indifferent, but with a background of historical 
and philosophical wisdom that made him the most intellectually dis-
tinguished man of the conference; the Italians, Orlando jovial, gen­
erous and ineffective; Sonnino with his hook-nose and jutting jaw, 
avid in his nationalism and generally disliked; the two Japs (we as­
sumed they were always the same two), their eyes on their maps -
replying to questions only with a monosyllabic "Yes." As you looked 
at these men you felt here is the group that democracy has entrusted 
with the mandate of assuring the new world. "They have the power." 
But as debates proceeded it became clear that these men were by 
no means all-powerful. Had they been as wise as Nestor they were 
still responsible to the people back home and the wisdom of their 
decision was still controlled by the popular endorsement. It was the 
paradox of chis war waged in the cause of democracy that the very 
triumph of democracy gave to a nationalistic public opinion a power 
to determine policies that sowed the seeds of another war, to save 
democracy once again. When Lloyd George preached moderation the 
Northcliffe Press barked at his heels; Clemenceau, to save his premier­
ship was forced to insert the guilt clause in the treaty; Orlando was 
ousted when he came co Rome without Fiume; the disavowal of Wilson 
by the Senate was ratified in the election of 1920.
It is not surprising that the peacemakers in view of their difficul­
ties. should have produced treaties which were far from perfe<:. �nd
which evoked a storm of critical discontent. The nature of our crmasm 
indicated the wealth of our ignorance. Nobody bothered to read the 
treaties, but they complained just as much. As Lloyd George remarked, 
"The Versailles Treaty is the most abused and the least perused of 
historical documents." People complained loudly of the Balkanization 
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of Central Europe by the Peace Conference when in faa the Hapsburg 
Monarchy had dissolved into the successor nations three months before 
the Peace Conference met. We attacked the compromises of the treaties, 
without realizing that except for compromises the�e would ha�e been 
no treaties at all. Bue we lacked the understandmg to eerce1ve the 
larger weaknesses of the Conference, !� part at least unpo� by 
impatient public opinion: 
.
the over-ambmous attempt to constitute a 
comprehensive secdemenc into which all the problems of the world 
should be fitted; the relative under-emphasis upon econo�c as com­
pared with political aspeas of peace; the over-emphasis upon the 
prevention of war through coeraon rather than the removal of the 
causes of war; the failure to continue the organs of inter-allied coop­
eration which were scrapped for new and untried institutions. 
Even so, the last Peace Conference did provide the basis for a 
long-lasting peace, if the successors to the Conference, statesmen and 
people, had possessed the wisdom and the courage co capitalize the 
opportunity. The world demanded a period of security and the settle­
ment offered two methods of security. The one was experimental, 
finding expression in Wilson's policy of collective security in the League 
of Nations. It was based upon the assumption chat if the peaceful 
powers of the world were perpetually mobilized in a political sense 
against any possible aggressor no single state would dare accack the 
system. A second method of security was also established, not as 
idealistic, but effeaive enough so long as the Powers cared to main­
tain it. This type of security was based upon the strategic control of 
geographical faaors, an expression of what today we should call geo­
politics. Oemenceau insisted that the Rhinelands on Germany's wescern 
flank be perpetually disarmed and that a strong Czechoslovak state 
control the bastion of Bohemia, a solid bulwark against German 
aggression in southeast Europe. While this situation lasted it was 
impossible for even a rearmed Germany co take the offensive. 
le is needless to rehearse here the course of events that Jed co the 
failure of European security. The League has been criticized because 
it lacked teeth. But the failure lay deeper - in the reluaance of the 
member states aaually to carry out the principles of coercion co which 
they �ad subscribed on paper, a reluaance made dear by British refusal 
co reinforce -che Covenar_it by the more specific undertaking, drafted in 
the Protocol, co take aaaon to restrain any nation guilty of aggression. 
So much was clear long before the League failed in ics restraint of 
Japan in Manchukuo, or Italy in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the cardinal 
aspect of �e League, as generally understood, was its emphasis upon 
the prevention of war co the neglect of _ cJ:ie pos�tive policy of promoting 
the interests of the member states, by JOmt action or compromise. The 
!-,eague neve� devel_oped the �ens_e o_f a common responsibility, which1s the essenaal basis of any 1nsucuuon and without which any inter­
national organization will lack reality. 
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This divorce between the theory of the League, as the instrument 
of the world community, and the actual face of Geneva existing as a 
battle ground of national conflict and a mirror of continental anarchy, 
was bound to prove fatal. Frank Simonds emphasized it in the early 
thirties. "The League," he wrote, "can have no power ocher than that 
which may be delegated to it by member nations. But no nation has 
yet consented to any delegation of power. The United Scates refused 
to join because of che nightmare of the superstate. The British Parlia­
ment rejected the Protocol because of fear that it might put a foreign 
mortgage upon its fleet and army. France places its right to security 
and Germany its claim to revision, above all present or prospective 
League authority. 
"As the Covenant of Europe dissolved into quarreling coalitions 
the League of Nations has degenerated into irreconciliable groups of 
countries. Today statesmen of all countries go to Geneva to impose 
national views. And their publics watch chem from afar, prepared to 
dismiss them if they consent co any modification or surrender." 
It is worth noting, however, that despite the League's failure, 
already manifest in the early 30's, Europe still possessed a strategic 
security which was sufficient co preserve the peace. It failed for the 
same reason as collective security- the unwillingness of the powers 
to assume responsibility for decisive acrion. The great test came in 
1936. The League had ceased to count, but the Rhinelands were still 
disarmed and the Czechs controlled their frontiers, vitally significant 
in the strategic sense. Encouraged by the Japanese example and the 
Italians, Hitler threw down the gage. He entered the Rhinelands in 
force. The time that Oemenceau had foreseen arrived and his gloomy 
prophecy was fulfilled. British and French refused to take action and 
within a few weeks the Germans began to build the Siegfried Line. 
The collapse of European security followed logically and rapidly. Pro­
teaed upon his western flank, Hitler could now afford to embark upon 
the annexation of Austria and a year later launch the attack upon 
Czechoslovakia. Munich awarded him control of the Bohemian bastion. 
European security had disappeared. He was free co dietate terms and 
if they were at last refused, to give the signal for another World War. 
In this collapse of the European system of security we Americans 
carry a responsibility which, in our criticisms of the European states, 
we sometimes forget. How far events might have been different if _wehad joined the League no man can safely assert. But our abstentatton 
from the League was merely a symptom of our whole irresponsible 
attitude toward international problems during the entire period between 
the wars. We wanted peace, but we would pay no price, run no risk, 
to achieve it. Because we asked nothing of the rest of the wodd we 
regarded the promotion of national interest by others as a crime. �e 
felt we had made our contribution co peace simply by ourselves abstam­
ing from a disturbance of the peace. This was foolish. And I remem-
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ber the historian Lord Accon saying: "The wages of sin are payable in 
another world; the wages of foJJy are payable down here below." 
The culmination of our naivete was achieved in our endorsement 
of the appeasement policy of Britain and France by th: passing of the 
Neutrality Aas. We thereby announced co them chat 1f they dared co 
oppose Hider they would get no help from us; we announced co �e 
people of the world that they could be suce chat we would stand aside 
from any conflict, no matter what its implications; chat we �ould even 
surrender our traditional claims ro the freedom of the seas m defense 
of which we had previously fought both British and �rmans; we 
also informed Hitler that so far as we were concerned he mtght proceed 
oo any course he chose without fear of the conseq_uences. We faced 
the awful results in 1940 when it seemed as though the lase bulwark 
between us and a German-ruled Europe had fallen. 
Our folly was the result of our ignorance and the time has come 
when we, as a nation, must learn the facts of international affairs and 
learn how co understand them. Back in 1907 Theodore Roosevelt 
insisted: "We have no choice, we people of the United States, as co 
whether we shall play a great part in the affairs of che world. That 
has been determined for us, by face, by the march of events. We have 
co play that pact. All that we can determine is whether we play it well 
or ill." If we are co play ic well we muse learn the rules of the game 
and the facts which shaJJ determine our accion. 
Certain of chese facts emerge from the history of recent years. 
Oearly circumstances not of a temporary sort, have developed, which 
compel us to cooperate accively with the other peace-loving nations. 
This is not a revolution. It is an evolution resulring from changing 
conditions of which we rather stupidly became aware at a late dace, but 
which are now and will remain compelling. Our founding fathers 
sought co insulate us from the European system, but they realized more clearly than some of their successors that the hope might not be 
realized. Indeed, in the days of Napoleon and the Holy Alliance, 
such Statesmen as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams 
saw protection from that system only in a close working alliance with 
the British. Today and henceforth we cannot afford to disregard 
Europe; our tardy realization of the danger of its control by an aggres­
sive power has already cost the greatest price in blood and treasure 
of our history. There can be no more Neutrality Aces. We muse par­
ticipate with equal activity in the peaceful organization of the Far East. 
Our policy of accive participation in world affairs depends upon 
the close cooperation of the great powers: the United States, Russia 
Great Britain, France, and because of her moral significance, China'. 
Accually at the moment, we, the British, and the Soviet Union hold 
the key �o the ge�eral security _problem. Recognizing that there aremany pomts at which our own mterests and those of the British will 
con�icc, we must pr?C�ed to_ isolate these issues and eliminate everypossible cause of fnmon with them. There is no single American 
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interest so important as the general interest of close collaboration with 
the British Commonwealth of nations. Any break would be disastrous. 
It is equally vital that in concert with the British we develop 
policies chat will assure the friendship and co peration of Soviet Russia. 
We muse srudy che wellsprings of Soviet foreign policy so as co under­
stand them and present our own policies in a light that will evoke 
from Russia a favorable response. This does not mean that we shall 
yield our independent point of view as to seeps co be taken, in the 
restoration of Europe and the maintenance of her peace. It does recog­
nize as a fact che indisputable strength of Russia and her immediate 
interest in various European problems which for us are distant, and 
important chiefly as factors liKely to affect world peace. 
France and China cannot be excluded from the group of con­
trolling powers. Our own interests are served by the revival of French 
political strength so that it may be comparable with the cultural posi­
tion she occupies among the civilized nations. The military potential 
of China is doubtless questionable; her history, her size, and the 
aspitations of her leaders compel her recognition. 
Today wars arise, directly or indirectly, from clashes among the 
great powers; che important problem is to find ways of reconciling the 
great powers to peace with each other and to cooperation in furthering 
the interests of all nations, small and large. Upon such cooperation 
must be founded whatever international organization finally results 
from the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The history of the League of Nations 
indicates conclusively that the sincere and intimate cooperative efforts 
of che great powers are basic to success. 
There is a further conclusion to be drawn from the history of the 
past twenty-five years, which is closely relevant to our /roblem ofsecurity. We Americans must learn to escape the untutore emotional­
ism which characterized the naivete of our: attitude at the close of the 
last war. We must beware, on the one hand, the excess of optimistic 
idealism that suggests that if only the proper formula of international 
organization can be agreed upon, a lasting peace will thereby be se­
cured; we must also beware the blind cynicism of the unregenerate 
nationalist who insists that safety lies only in regarding e"!ery alien 
state as an inevitable enemy - each for himself and the devil take the 
hindmost. Both attitudes are unrealistic. We cannot expect suddenly 
to achieve perfection. The last Peace Settlement was wrecked � t�is 
country because of Perfectionists on the one hand and Isolat1orusts 
on the other. We cannot afford to repeat the disaster. It is worth 
always remembering the words of Salvador de Madariaga:_ "Our �esmust be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk m the nght 
direction but we must walk step by step. Our: tasks are: to define wh�c is desirable; co define what is possible . . . . ; to carry out what 1s 
possible in the spirit of what is desirable." 
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